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M tf)£ Supreme Court of fyt i£>tate of ffltaf)
Insight Assets, Inc.,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-17-

Homero Farias,
Defendant and Appellee.

Brief of Appellant
S T A T E M E N T OF J U R I S D I C T I O N
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3102(3)(j) (2010). The Appellant, Insight Assets, Inc., appeals a final order granting Farias7
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, denying Insight's Motion for Summary Judgment, and quieting title to Farias.

S T A T E M E N T OF ISSUES
POINT I.

Did the trial court err by denying Insight's in rem foreclosure at summary

judgment where undisputed facts demonstrate that Insight's Trust Deed (the Phalen
Trust Deed) was a vendor purchase money mortgage, the third party mortgagor had
notice of the Phalen Trust Deed, and the obligor defaulted on the Phalen Trust Deed?
And where there was never a subordination agreement between the Phalens and FFFC,
did the trial court err in finding that the Phalen Trust Deed was subordinate to the FFFC
Deed?

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW AND ISSUE PRESERVATION

"Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of law, [appellate courts] give the
trial court's legal conclusions no particular deference/' 1
Insight preserved this issue in its motion for summary judgment and memorandum
in opposition to Farias' motion for partial summary judgment. 2
POINT II.

Did the trial court err by determining that Appellant's purchase money

trust deed was subject to the operation of Utah's Recording Act?
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND ISSUE PRESERVATION

"Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of law, [appellate courts] give the
trial court's legal conclusions no particular deference." 3
Insight preserved this issue in its motion for summary judgment and memorandum
in opposition to Farias' motion for partial summary judgment. 4
POINT III.

Did the trial court err in determining that Appellee was a bona fide pur-

chaser for value where Appellee had actual a n d / o r constructive notice that the vendor
trust deed had not been reconveyed?

1

Mast v. Overson, 971 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

2

R. 000080, 000462.

* Mast at 931.
4

R. 000080, 000462.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW AND ISSUE PRESERVATION

"Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of law, [appellate courts] give the
trial court's legal conclusions no particular deference/' 5
Insight preserved this issue in its motion for summary judgment and memorandum
in opposition to Farias7 motion for partial summary judgment. 6

RULES, STATUTES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following rules, statutes, and constitutional provisions are relevant to the issues on
appeal and are attached at ADDENDUM A:
RULES

•

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56.

STATUTES

•

Utah Code Ann. § 77-8-1(3).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

•

Utah Constitution, Article I, Sections 7.

•

United States Constitution, Amendments V and XIV.

S T A T E M E N T OF THE C A S E
On November 19, 2009, Insight filed an in rem foreclosure complaint and named
Homero Farias as a necessary party, as current occupant of the property. 7
On January 15, 2010, Farias answered that complaint, and counterclaimed for quiet
title, slander of title, and wrongful lien.8

5

Mast at 931.

6

R. 000080, 000462.

7

R. at 000001.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Insight moved for summary judgment on its complaint on February 9, 2010.9 Farias
moved to continue Insight's motion pending further discovery. 10 The trial court granted
the motion to continue and discovery ensued. 11
On September 7, 2010, Farias moved for partial summary judgment on its affirmative defenses and its quiet title counterclaim. 12 The trial court granted Farias' motion for
partial summary judgment and denied Insight's summary judgment motion; the court
further denied Farias' request for attorney fees.13 Farias dismissed with prejudice his
remaining counterclaims, II & III, by way of stipulation by the parties. 14
Insight timely filed its Notice of Appeal on December 8, 2010,15 and Farias crossappealed the trial court's denial of attorney fees on December 23, 2010.16

S T A T E M E N T OF F A C T S U N D I S P U T E D BY F A R I A S
Insight Assets filed an in rem foreclosure action seeking to foreclose on its trust deed
against the real property owned by Homero Farias. 17 Insight's trust deed was assigned

8

R. 000047.

9

R. 000080.

10

R. 000157.

11

R. 000205.

12

R. 000316.

13

R. 000573, 000580.

14

R. 000582.

15

R, 000599.

16

R. 000605.

17

R. 000001.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to it by Joseph and Denise Phalen, who owned the property in 2004.18 The Phalens sold
the property to a buyer, and financed a portion of the purchase price. 19 The remaining
portion of the purchase price was provided to the buyer by First Franklin Financial
Corporation. 20 The Phalens secured their loan to the buyer with a vendor trust deed,
and First Franklin secured their loan to the buyer with a third party trust deed against
the property. 21 First Franklin and the Phalens knew they were each financing a portion
of the property and had knowledge of each other. 22
Both the Phalen Trust Deed and the First Franklin Trust Deed were recorded simultaneously with the other documents evidencing the sale of the property. 23 The Phalen
Trust Deed is a vendor purchase money mortgage; the First Franklin Trust deed is a
third party purchase money mortgage. 24
The buyer defaulted on their obligations under both trust deeds almost immediately, and First Franklin began foreclosing its trust deed less than ten months later. 25 First
Franklin's interest in the property was conveyed to Wells Fargo Bank via a Trustee's

18

R. 000080 at | | 9-10; 000171.

19

R. 000080 at | If 6-9; 000047 at | | 6-7; 000171.

20

R. 000080 at f 110-12; 000047 at ^ 1 10-12; 000171.

21

Id.

22

R. 0000475-76.

23

R. 000080 at f 1 6-12; 000047 at 11j 6-12; 000171.

24

R. 000574.

25

R. 000080 at | f 17-18, 35; 000047 at H 17-18; 000171.
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Deed on June 14, 2005.26 The Phalen Trust Deed was never reconveyed, and the title
record kept at the Weber County Recorder's Office shows that the Phalen Trust Deed
still encumbers the property to this day. 27
Insight Assets, Inc. acquired the Phalen Trust Deed by assignment from Denise and
Joseph Phalen. 28 Insight foreclosed on the Phalen Trust Deed immediately by judicial
foreclosure. 29
The trial court denied Insight's motion for summary judgment and granted Farias'
partial motion for summary judgment, finding that Farias was a bona fide purchaser for
value, and takes the property free and clear of Insight's lien under the Phalen Trust
Deed. 30 The trial court found that the Phalen Trust Deed was a vendor purchase money
mortgage, but that its priority as a vendor purchase money mortgage was eviscerated
by Utah's Recording Statute, and therefore junior to the extinguished First Franklin
Trust Deed. 31

S U M M A R Y OF A R G U M E N T
POINT I.

Insight is entitled to summary judgment. Vendors who sell their property

and finance all or a portion of the sale are entitled, as a matter of law, to retain a super
priority lien status to protect their interest. This is because a third party mortgager, like
26

R. 000080 at f 19; 000047 at f 19; 000171.

27

R. 000080 at 1Jt 20,; 000047 at f 19; 000171.

28

R. 000080 at f t 9-10; 000171.

29

R. 000001; 000080 at f f 9-10; 000171.

30

R. 000573.

31 Ibid.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~6~

a bank, is only out the money they lent if the buyer defaults, but the vendor is out both
her money and her property. To protect these vendors, Utah courts have recognized the
priority status these vendor purchase money mortgages have over third party mortgages. Insight holds a vendor purchase money mortgage, and the buyer did default. Yet,
the trial court improperly denied Insight's motion. Because Insight's Trust Deed (the
Phalen Trust Deed) is a vendor purchase money mortgage, and because FFFC had notice of the Phalen Trust Deed, which was recorded simultaneously with FFFCs Trust
Deed, the Phalen Trust Deed was superior to the FFFC at the time of the FFFC Deed's inception. And, the Phalens never subordinated their Trust Deed to the FFFC Trust Deed.
Accordingly, the foreclosure of the FFFC Trust Deed did not foreclose the senior Phalen
Trust Deed. Thus, the Phalen Trust Deed runs with the land, still encumbers the property, and Insight is entitled to judgment allowing it to foreclose on its deed. The court
erred in denying Insight's motion for summary judgment, and reversal is warranted.
POINT II.

While Utah is a race-notice state, this Court has carved out an exception to

Utah's Recording Statute in cases where vendors sell their property and retain an interest; the Court called this exception to the recording act the purchase money mortgage
doctrine. The doctrine holds that a vendor purchase money mortgage is superior to a
third party purchase money mortgage, regardless of the order in which those mortgages were recorded on title. This common law doctrine is supported by the plain language
of the recording statute where it states that it does not affect the validity of documents
where the parties have notice. The recording act does not apply to purchase money
mortgages where the parties have notice of each other. To hold that the recording act
applies to purchase money mortgages would be to eviscerate the doctrine itself. If the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated~OCR,
7 ~may contain errors.

recording act applied to purchase money mortgages, there would be no need for the
doctrine —why would this Court create it if the recording act always set forth the order
of priority between vendors and third parties? The fact is, this Court specifically carved
out an exception to Utah's recording statute for vendor purchase money mortgages, and
the exception applies in all cases where the parties have notice of each other. If the parties to the sale (the buyer, vendor and third party financer) do not have notice of each
other, then this Court has held that no purchase money mortgage exists, and the recording act applies. Because FFFC, the Phalens, and the Boecks had notice of each other and
by the nature of the sale, the recording act defers, and the Phalen Trust Deed is superior
as a matter of law.
POINT III.

Farias is not a bona fide purchaser, allowing him to avoid foreclosure. The

trial court's analysis of the bona fide purchaser doctrine and the recording act are incorrect as a matter of law, and the court should reverse on that error alone. Yet the Court
can go further in its analysis and find that Farias did have knowledge that the Phalen
Trust Deed still encumbered the property. It is undisputed that the Phalen Trust Deed
was never reconveyed or otherwise extinguished by documents recorded on title that
specifically discussed the Phalen Trust Deed. Because of this, Farias had notice that the
Phalen Trust Deed had not been satisfied and still encumbered the property. Yet, Farias
assumed, and he readily admits his assumption, that the Phalen Trust Deed had been
extinguished under the common law doctrine that holds that junior liens are extinguished by senior liens. And he assumed that the Phalen Trust Deed was junior to the
FFFC Deed. However, these assumptions cannot be a bar to Insight's foreclosure on its
deed. That Farias contracted with a title company who literally wrote a book on and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
- 8 may
- contain errors.

advised its employees about the existence of purchase money mortgages further
demonstrates that Farias was aware that the Phalen Trust Deed was superior under this
doctrine and still encumbered the property. That is precisely why the title company insures its work —because Farias delegated the task of determining whether the title was
free and clear to his agent. As such, Farias must have known about the Phalen Trust
Deed, and therefore cannot avoid foreclosure as a bona fide purchaser.
*

*

*

The trial court committed reversible error on each of these issues, and the Court should
further clarify the purchase money mortgage doctrine, and reverse and remand with instructions to the trial court to make findings and conclusions consistent with those holdings.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.

The trial court erred in denying Insight's in rem foreclosure at summary
judgment; undisputed facts established that the Phalen Trust Deed was
a vendor purchase money mortgage, and superior to the FFFC trust deed
as a matter of law because they were recorded simultaneously and FFFC
and Phalen knew of each other's deeds.

William and Roberta Boeck bought property and financed it with two mortgages: one
from the seller (vendor) and one from a bank. The Boecks defaulted on both loans and
the bank foreclosed on its trust deed. Yet under Utah law, vendor mortgages have first
priority regardless of recording order and junior liens cannot foreclose senior liens.
Therefore, Insight Assets is entitled to foreclose on the Property because its lien still encumbers the property and is in default.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A. Insight Assets' Vendor Trust Deed is a vendor purchase money mortgage.
Insight Assets' bought the Phalen's purchase money mortgage and steps into their
shoes as originator. 32 When a property owner sells a property and finances part of the
purchase price, he creates a vendor purchase money mortgage. If this property owner
assigns his purchase money mortgage, it retains its original status. As the Utah Supreme Court affirmed recently, "the common law puts the assignee in the assignor's
shoes, whatever the shoe size/' 33
In Gray v. Kappos, the Utah Supreme Court held, "A purchase-money mortgage is a
mortgage which is given upon the property sold to secure the balance of the purchase
price remaining unpaid. It is a debt created by the purchase/' 3 4 And although in modern times, trusts —instead of mortgages — are used to finance property, Utah law still
recognizes these instruments as purchase money mortgages. In Nelson v. Stoker, the
Utah Supreme Court wrote "we refer to the term 'purchase money mortgage' as encompassing both mortgages and trust deeds which are given by a vendee to secure a
purchase price or unpaid balance." 35
Purchase money mortgages come in two flavors: vendor and third-party. When the
seller of property finances a portion of the purchase price, a "seller carry-back" mortgage is created. The legal term for this instrument is vendor purchase money mortgage.

32

Sunridge v. RB&G, 2010 UT 6, f 13.

33

Ibid.

34

Gray v. Kappos, 61 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1936).

35

Nelson v. Stoker, 669 P.2d 390, 394 (Utah 1983).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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When a bank finances a portion of the purchase price, a third-party purchase money
mortgage is created. 36
William and Roberta Boeck bought property from the Phalens. When they bought
the Property, they financed part of the purchase price with the Phalens. This financing
between the Boecks and the Phalens created a vendor purchase money mortgage.
1. The Phalens assigned Insight Assets their vendor purchase money mortgage.
Here, Insight Assets bought the Phalen's purchase money mortgage. 37 Under Utah law,
this is still a purchase money mortgage. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-103:
(6) In a transaction other than a consumer-goods transaction, a purchase-money
security interest does not lose its status as such, even if:
(a) the purchase-money collateral also secures an obligation that is not a
purchase-money obligation;
(b) collateral that is not purchase-money collateral also secures the purchase-money obligation; or
(c) the purchase-money obligation has been renewed, refinanced, consolidated, or restructured. 38
Accordingly, although the Vendor Trust Deed changed owners, it retained the same
rights, status, and priority.
B. The Phalen Trust Deed is the first priority deed because when vendor trust
deeds and third party trust deeds record concurrently, Utah law favors vendors.

36

See Generally Kemp v. Zions First National Bank, 470 P.2d 390 (Utah 1970).

37

R. 000080 at f 9; 000171.

38

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-103 (2010).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Phalen Trust Deed is the first priority lien encumbering this property. Generally,
mortgage priority is established by recording order. Yet Utah law recognizes that vendor purchase money mortgages supersede Utah's race-notice statute.
Utah is a race-notice state; usually, the first deed to record is the first deed in priority. Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-103 states:
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if:
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and for a
valuable consideration; and
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded. 39
Yet under Utah legal precedent, vendor purchase money mortgages take priority
over other mortgages, regardless of which deed records first. In Kemp v. Zions First National Bank, the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged this and wrote:
.. .a purchase money mortgage (plaintiffs mortgage here), executed in connection with a conveyance of land, or in pursuance of an agreement, as part of a
transaction, ordinarily takes preference over any other lien attaching through the
financing of the transaction ([purchaser's] mortgage to Zions); and further, more
specifically, that, "Where the contest is between a purchase money mortgage to a
third person who advances part of the purchase price [Zions Bank] and a purchase money mortgage to the vendor [plaintiff] for the balance, the latter is given
preference even if he had notice of the former/' 40
In Colorado, which also has a race-notice statute, the Colorado Supreme Court
wrote that, "even a third party who loans money to the purchaser that is applied to the
purchase, and who takes back a mortgage on the purchased property, cannot acquire

39

Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-103 (2010).

40

Kemp v. Zions First National Bank, 470 P.2d 390, 393 (Utah 1970).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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rights to the property from the purchaser unencumbered by the vendor's mortgage, regardless of the order in which the documents are signed." 41
The only instrument that reprioritizes a vendor's purchase-money mortgage is a
subordination agreement. In Nelson v. Stoker, the Utah Supreme Court held:
[I]f the purchaser of land, upon receiving a conveyance thereof, as part of the
same transaction executes a mortgage to the vendor to secure a part or the whole
of the purchase price, such mortgage... is entitled to priority over any preexisting
claims... at least in the absence of an agreement between the parties subordinating the purchase money mortgage to other liens or claims. 42
In this case, on April 22, 2004, the Boecks created a vendor purchase-money mortgage to the Phalens and a third-party purchase-money mortgage to FFFC simultaneously. These were recorded on the same day at virtually the same time, as evidenced by
their near sequential numbering. 43 Importantly, no subordination agreement was recorded and presumably, is nonexistent. 44 Therefore, as a matter of law, the Phalen Trust
Deed is the first priority deed on the Property.
C. Despite Wells Fargo's foreclosure, the Phalen Trust Deed still encumbers the
property and is unforeclosed.
The Phalen Trust Deed is valid because it cannot be foreclosed by a subordinate lien.
In Dunlap v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain, the Utah Court of Appeals reiterated long
held law that a junior lien cannot foreclose a senior lien:

41

ALH Holding Co. v. Bank ofTelluride, 18 P.3d 742, 745 (Colo. 2000).

42

Nelson v. Stoker, 669 P.2d 390, 394 (Utah 1983).

43

R. 000080 at ]f 6 & 8; R. 000171.

44

R. 000080 at

EXHIBIT

K.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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.. .most importantly, a mortgage foreclosure action can only affect the interests of
a mortgagor and others who hold subsequent and inferior interests to the mortgagee. 45
In this case, Wells Fargo foreclosed on the Property on June 14, 2005. Yet as established above and as a matter of law, the Phalen Trust Deed is the senior lien upon the
property and has been since the Phalen-Boeck sale. Therefore, the Phalen Trust Deed is
unaffected by Wells Fargo 7 s foreclosure. The Phalen Trust Deed remains valid and in effect, and the trial court erred in not granting Insight's in rem foreclosure.
D. A balance upon the Phalen Trust Deed is owed and due.
The Boecks never made any payment towards the Vendor Trust Deed; they are in default. A principal balance of $17,600, plus interest, costs and attorney fees is due.
E. A de facto subordination

agreement is no subordination

at all.

Farias concedes that no instrument shows the Phalens agreed to subordinate their trust
deed to FFFC, and no subordination agreement was ever executed or recorded on title.
Yet he argues that some understanding existed between the parties and created a de facto subordination agreement. This argument is factually and legally deficient.
Because there was never any agreement — first there was no meeting of the minds
between the Phalens and FFFC; second, the parties never exchanged consideration; and
third an unwritten agreement is barred by the Statute of Frauds — Farias cannot establish subordination.

45

Dunlap v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain, 2003 UT App 283, If 15, 76 P.3d 711.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1. The Phalens may have erroneously thought they were in a junior lien position to
FFFC, but they never entered into any such agreement.
A valid agreement to subordinate requires an offer and acceptance — or a "meeting of
the minds77 regarding terms — and consideration; the agreement must be between the
vendor(s) and the third party financer. 46 Absent a "meeting of the minds" between these parties, no subordination agreement exists. In this case, no subordination agreement
exists and Farias cannot demonstrate one through weak parole evidence.
In this case, FFFC and the Phalens never communicated with each other, either in
writing or verbally. This was undisputed by Farias.
The Phalens never agreed to be in a junior position and swore to that under oath.
Farias took the depositions of both Joseph and Denise Phalen, under oath, and both
stated that they never agreed to be in a junior lien position behind FFFC. That testimony
was undisputed by Farias. 47
Joseph and Denise Phalen testified that they never had any conversations with FFFC
regarding whose lien would be first or second, 48 that they never entered into any
agreement with FFFC to subordinate their lien position, 49 and that they didn't have
knowledge about how to record their lien on the property and was relying on their
agents at closing to make sure the documents were recorded properly. 50

46

UTAH REAL PROPERTY LAW

§ 14.02(h)(3) (2008 Ed.).

47

R. 000320; 000518.

48

R. 000611, Tr. 46:2-4,45:3-6; R. 000612, Tr. 38:5-9.

49

R. 000611, Tr. 45:10-18; R. 000612, Tr. 38:16-19.

50

R. 000611, Tr. 52:13-53:1; R. 000612, Tr. 42:23-43:2.
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This testimony demonstrates that they never "expressly agreed" to subordinate their
trust deed to FFFC.
2. Not only was there no "meeting of the minds" regarding subordination, but there
was no consideration either.
A first priority lien is a valuable position; a first priority lien holder is virtually guaranteed to recover on the security if the debt goes bad. Giving up such a valuable position
requires consideration sufficient to support the promise. And the consideration must be
present and valuable. 51
Farias failed to present evidence of any consideration given by FFFC to the Phalens
as consideration for the alleged, cobbled together, tacit agreement Farias is advancing.
Without this, any such agreement is void on its face.
3. To be valid and binding, the Statute of Frauds requires any subordination agreement between the Phalens and FFFC to be in writing.
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1, the Statute of Frauds, explicitly requires all real property
agreements and conveyances to be in writing. The problems Farias complained of in its
motion underscores the purpose of and need for the Statute of Frauds. Parties pass on,
memories fade, companies close, and disputes arise regarding what verbal statements
and promises meant.
Farias argues both sides of the Statute of Frauds to an illogical conclusion. In one
breath, he argues —incorrectly— that Insights Asset's position requires bona fide purchasers to look beyond recorded documents; something they have no obligation to do.
Yet in the next breath, he argues that a verbal understanding between the parties to

si 59 C.J.S. MORTGAGES § 17 (1998).
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subordinate priority does not need to be in writing; that we can look beyond recorded
documents to establish this. Both cannot be correct.
Insight's position on this issue is consistent and clear — a vendor trust deed recorded
simultaneously with a third party trust deed in the same transaction is on its face in a
first lien position, without further inquiry into the recorded documents. The nature of
the vendor trust deed provides clear notice to anyone looking at title that the vendor
trust deed is superior, regardless of recording order.
Conversely, a subordination agreement recorded on title provides clear notice to anyone looking at title that the parties have agreed to subordinate according to the plain
terms of that recorded document.
This is the only logical position for the Court to adopt, and accords with Utah law.
To accept Farias7 position, the Court would necessarily require all persons looking at
the title to look beyond the terms of the recorded documents to determine whether
there is evidence of an agreement regarding the priority of liens.
POINT II.

The trial court erred by determining that Insight's purchase money trust
deed was subject to the operation of Utah's Recording Act?

In his motion for partial summary judgment, Farias argued that Insight was not entitled
to priority as a vendor. He argued that because FFFC had no notice of the Phalens, the
recording acts must apply. 52 Farias went on to state that FFFC did not have notice of the
Phalens, and therefore the vendor purchase money rule does not apply, and argued the
trial court must defer to the recording act. Insight definitively foreclosed Farias' argument by reciting this Court's holding in Kemp which found that the vendor purchase
52

R. 000336.
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money rule supersedes the recording statute "even if [the vendor] had notice of [the
third party mortgagor]/ 753
However, in its decision, the trial court did not discuss the issue of notice, and instead held,
However, the [Supreme] Court also recognized that "in spite of the foregoing
generalities, .. .an examination of the authorities and the principles involved will
show that the result actually depends upon the circumstances of the given case,
the equities, and the effect of the recording act. This view is in line with the Restatement. "A purchase money mortgage given to a vendor of real estate, in the absence of a contrary intent of the parties to it and subject to the operation of the
recording acts, has priority over a purchase money mortgage on that real estate
given to a person who is not its vendor." In light of these authorities, the Court
believes [Insight's] position overstates the scope of the vendor purchase money
priority rule. The rule does not apply in every situation, but is rather subject to
the operation of the recording act.54
For this Court to adopt the trial court's position would be to completely eviscerate the
vendor purchase money doctrine is has established. The trial court's holding is this: the
recording act prevents a purchase money trust deed from having priority over a third
party deed when it is recorded later in time, but simultaneously as the third party deed.
This analysis is incorrect as a matter of law, and the Court must review the trial court's
decision for correctness, according it no deference.

53

R. 000475 (citing Kemp v. Zions First National Bank, 470 P.2d 309, 393 (Utah 1970)).

54

R. 000573 at K A (internal citations omitted)(emphasis in original).
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A. Regardless of notice, the Purchase Money Mortgage Lien Priority Doctrine supersedes recording statutes.
Though not addressed by the trial court in its order, Farias cited a property restatement
for the proposition that "where only one of the parties has notice of the other, the recording acts... should govern..." Yet this Court specifically addressed this notion and
found it lacking.
In Kemp v. Zions First National Bank, the Court wrote:
Where the contest is between a purchase money mortgage to a third person who
advances part of the purchase price [Zions Bank] and a purchase money mortgage to the vendor [plaintiff] for the balance, the latter is given preference even if
he had notice of the former\55
And Phalen failed to dispute that FFFC had notice of the Phalens through these documents, but rather argued incorrect points of agency law; yet the documents speak for
themselves. 56 FFFC clearly knew the Boecks had obtained additional financing for the
full purchase price of the property, and is presumed to have read each of the documents
at closing that show the Phalens were securing a trust deed on the property.
In First Natl Bank v. Foote, the Utah Supreme Court held "the knowledge of [an]
agent concerning the business which he is transacting for his principal is to be imputed
to his principal/ 757 In Maoris v. Sculptured Software, Inc., it stated that a principal is imputed with "[a]n agent's knowledge of matters within the scope of his or her authority
[because] it is presumed that such knowledge will be disclosed to the principal." 58 And

55

Kemp v. Zions First National Bank, 470 P.2d 390, 393 (Utah 1970) (emphasis added).
R. 000518.
57
First Nat'l Bank v. Foote, 42 P. 205, 207 (Utah 1895).
58
Maoris v. Sculptured Software, Inc., 2001 UT 4 3 , 1 2 1 , 24 P.3d 984.
56
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in Latses v. Nick Floor, Inc., it held this rule is broad and encompasses "all notice or
knowledge relating to the subject-matter of the agency which the agent acquires or obtains while acting as such agent and within the scope of his authority/' 5 9
In this case, both the Phalens and First Franklin shared an agent, US Title. US Title
acted as the trustee for both the Phalens 7 and First Franklin's trust deeds. As Farias noted, the Phalens and First Franklin consummated this transaction with Boecks at the US
Title Office.60 The First Franklin Trust Deed lists "US TITLE" as its trustee; the Phalens'
note does too. 61 Accordingly, both First Franklin and the Phalens knew of each other as
a matter law. Thus, this Court cannot find that the recording act applies because FFFC
did not have notice of the Phalens.

B. Because the Phalens and FFFC had notice of each other's trust deed, Utah Code
defers to the Purchase Money Mortgage Priority.
The trial court improperly interpreted Utah law regarding the applicability of the recording act. Utah's Recording Act defers to the Purchase Money Mortgage doctrine
where deeds are executed simultaneously and the vendor and third-party financer have
notice of each other. Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-102(3) states, "[t]his section does not affect
the validity of a document with respect to the parties to the document and all other persons who have notice of the document."

59

Latses v. Nick Floor, Inc., 99 Utah 214, 222,104 P.2d 619, 623 (1940).
° R. 000316 at f 10.
61
R. 000316 at Exhibit I, | (D), and Exhibit B, p. 1, respectively.

6
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This language is nearly identical to the statutory language in the ALH Holding case
in the Colorado Supreme Court. 62 In that case, the third-party financer (Bank of Telluride) argued that it was entitled to protection from the Recording Act in its State. The
holding in the ALH case is directly on point to the issues here and favored the vendor.
The court's analysis of the applicability of the recording statute and its interaction with
the Purchase Money Mortgage doctrine provides significant guidance to this Court in
determining the very similar issues under a nearly identical statute.
The Colorado Supreme Court held in ALH that the recording statute did not apply
because the vendor and Bank of Telluride had notice of each other's trust deeds. The
relevant language of Colorado's recording statute reads, "No .. .document shall be valid
as against any class of persons with any kind of rights who first records, except between
the parties thereto and such as have notice thereof."63
The ALH court held, "[ajccording to the plain language of the statute, even though
the later grantee's instrument was recorded first, it still cannot benefit from the recording statute if it has notice of the earlier unrecorded instrument." 64
The court went on to hold,
[w]here a security agreement, or mortgage, is executed between a purchaser and
a vendor as part of the same transaction in which the purchaser acquires title to
the property, execution of the deed and mortgage are considered simultaneous
acts. As a matter of law, such a purchaser never has an unencumbered title to
property in which he can assign further rights. Therefore, even a third party who
62

ALH Holding Co. v. Bank of Telluride, 18 P.3d 742 (2000).

63

Colorado Revised Statutes § 38-35-109(1) (2000).

64

Id. at 744 (holding, "Therefore, although the Bank's deed of trust was recorded first,
the recording statute would confer no priority upon it if it were aware of [vendor's]
unrecorded deed of trust before acquiring its own rights in the property.").
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loans money to the purchaser that is applied to the purchase, and who takes back
a mortgage on the purchased property, cannot acquire rights to the property
from the purchaser unencumbered by the vendor's mortgage, regardless of the
order in which the documents are signed. 65

The court's analysis describes in detail the real property legal underpinnings of the
purchase money mortgage doctrine.
In this case, where Phalen conveyed title to Boecks in the same transaction where
Boecks gave Phalen a trust deed, the Phalen Trust Deed encumbered the property at the
time FFFC took its trust deed on the property. Therefore, the Phalen Trust Deed had
priority over the FFFC Deed, despite the fact that the FFFC Trust Deed recorded first.
The only way the FFFC Deed could acquire priority over the Phalen Trust Deed would
have been if FFFC did not have notice of the Phalen Trust Deed.
However, "[b]y acquiring its rights to the property in the same transaction, with full
knowledge that the loan of the vendor [ ] would be secured by deed of trust, the Bank
necessarily had notice of [vendor's] unrecorded instrument within the meaning of the recording statute.. .The statute therefore, could not resolve the question of priorities in favor of the Bank/' 66 Meaning, because FFFC knew that Phalen was lending Boecks the
$17,600 to buy the Property and that Phalen was taking a trust deed to secure their purchase money loan, the recording act cannot provide protection to either FFFC, or Farias.
When the priority of rights in real property is not dictated by the operation of the recording states, the purchase money mortgage doctrine applies. 67

65

Id. at 745 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

66

Ibid, (emphasis added).

67

Kemp v. Zions First National Bank, 470 P.2d 390 (Utah 1970).
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Under Utah law, vendor purchase money mortgages take priority over other mortgages, regardless of which deed records first. In Kemp v. Zions First National Bank, the
Utah Supreme Court acknowledged this and wrote:
...a purchase money mortgage (plaintiffs7 mortgage here), executed in connection with a conveyance of land, or in pursuance of an agreement, as part of a
transaction, ordinarily takes preference over any other lien attaching through the
financing of the transaction ([purchaser's] mortgage to Zions); and further, more
specifically, that, "Where the contest is between a purchase money mortgage to a
third person who advances part of the purchase price [Zions Bank] and a purchase money mortgage to the vendor [plaintiff] for the balance, the latter is given
preference even if he had notice of the former/ 768
This is exactly what the Colorado Supreme Court held in ALU, "even a third party
who loans money to the purchaser that is applied to the purchase, and who takes back a
mortgage on the purchased property, cannot acquire rights to the property from the
purchaser unencumbered by the vendor's mortgage, regardless of the order in which
the documents are signed." 69
And as argued in Point I herein, the Stoker and Kemp cases hold that regarding vendor purchase money mortgage priority, Utah law is uniform. Insight Assets' Vendor
Trust Deed is superior to the Third-Party Deed despite race notice. Thus, the trial
court's holding that the recording act eviscerates Insight's priority status under the
vendor purchase money mortgage doctrine was an error, and this court should reverse
and remand with instructions to the trial court that it must not use the recording act to
bar Insight's in rem foreclosure.

68

Id. at 393.

69

ALH Holding Co. v. Bank ofTelluride, 18 P.3d 742, 745 (Colo. 2000).
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POINT III.

The trial court erred in determining that Farias was a bona fide purchaser for value where Farias had actual and/or constructive notice that the
vendor trust deed had not been reconveyed?

The trial court's decision holds that portions of Utah's Recording Act creates a bona fide
purchaser defense. This is incorrect as a matter of law; the bona fide purchaser affirmative defense is a creature of common law as defined by this Court in Baldwin v. Burton.70
Farias led the trial court into this error because it took this portion of its holding directly
from Farias' memorandum in support. 71
Accordingly, this Court should vacate that portion of the trial court's decision which
states,
Because the vendor purchase money priority rule is subject to the operation of
the recording act, the first issue that must be decided by this Court is whether
[Farias] is entitled to the protection of Utah's recording act as a bona fide purchaser for value. 72
The trial court failed to correctly analyze the bona fide purchaser doctrine, and make
findings in accordance with that law. This Court should remand on that issue alone.
As a matter of common law, Farias is not entitled to protection as a bona fide purchaser in any event. A bona fide purchaser is "one who pays valuable consideration for
a conveyance, acts in good faith, and takes without notice of an adverse claim or others'
outstanding rights to the seller's estate." 73

70

Baldwin v. Burton, 850P.2d 1188,1197-98 (Utah 1993).

71

R. 000330-31.

72

R. 000575.

73

Baldwin v. Burton, 850P.2d 1188,1197-98 (Utah 1993).
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The trial court's analysis focused only on the notice issue, holding "the question for
the Court is whether [Farias] had constructive notice that the priority between the FFFC
trust deed and the Phalen trust deed was other than reflected by the order of the recording of the documents." 74
As Insight demonstrates herein, Farias did have knowledge of the Phalen Trust
Deed and therefore cannot take the property free and clear, either under the Recording
Act or the bona fide purchaser doctrine.
A. Farias is not a bona fide purchaser. He had actual notice that the Phalen Trust
Deed had not been reconveyed and still encumbered the Property.
The trial court found that Farias is a bona fide purchaser of the Property — and exempt
from foreclosure — because he relied on recorded documents, Utah's race notice statute,
and the "axiomatic" common law doctrine that upon foreclosure, a senior lien forecloses
and extinguishes junior liens. Yet the trial court reached its bona fide purchaser assertion with piecemeal common law. When examining common law as a whole, including
the purchase money mortgage doctrine, Farias is not a bona fide purchaser.
1. In this case and as a matter of law, race-notice is inapplicable
The trial court found that Farias was a bona fide purchaser because Utah's race notice
statute absolves him of any responsibility to look past recording order to determine priority. Accordingly, Insight Assets' Vendor Trust Deed is moot. This argument is plainly
false.

74

R. 000576.
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As stated supra in Point LB. herein, under Utah law, vendor purchase money mortgages take priority over other mortgages, regardless of which deed records first.
And in Nelson v. Stoker the Utah Supreme Court specifically held:
The overwhelming weight of authority recognizes the special priority accorded a
vendor's purchase money mortgage.(fn2) This Court has also acknowledged that
priority. See Kemp v. Zions First National Bank, 24 Utah 2d 288,470 P.2d 390
(1970).75
The footnote referenced by the Court points to nine treatises for support. Moreover
in that case, the Court reaffirms its holdings by concluding that ".. .this Court recognizes and follows the doctrine granting purchase money mortgages a special priority/' 76
Utah recognizes that Vendor Purchase Money Mortgages are superior to all other
liens, specifically Third-Party Vendor Purchase Money Mortgages.
Again, in Nelson and quoted at length, the Utah Supreme Court noted that:
It is familiar learning that a purchase money mortgage, executed at the same
time as the deed of purchase of land, or in pursuance of agreement as part of one
continuous transaction, takes precedence over any other claim or lien attaching
to the property through the vendee-mortgagor. This is so even though the claim
antedates the execution of the mortgage to the seller....
This rule, of course, is not confined to judgments and attachments; on the contrary, it extends to all liens legal or equitable, that otherwise might clasp the land at
and with its acquisition by the mortgagor. All such liens, indifferently, yield to
the purchase money mortgage. 77
Regarding vendor purchase money mortgage priority, Utah law is uniform. Insight
Assets' Vendor Trust Deed is superior to the Third-Party Deed despite race notice.

75

Nelson v. Stoker, 669 P.2d 390, 393 (Utah 1983) (emphasis added).

76

Id. at 396.
Id. at 394.

77

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-26-

(

2. The documents recorded on the Property's title show an outstanding lien.
The trial court held that Farias took possession of the property without notice of an adverse claim or others 7 outstanding rights to the seller's title and that recorded documents fail to show any outstanding lien. That finding is claim is facially incorrect and
wrong as a matter of law.
Under Utah Code, notice is imparted to purchasers regarding "each document executed, acknowledged, and certified.. .from the time of recording within the appropriate
county recorder/' 78 And also under Utah Code, "when an obligation secured by a trust
deed has been satisfied, the trustee shall, upon written request by the beneficiary, reconvey the trust property." 79
Where a title record shows a recorded trust deed but no recorded reconveyance, a
purchaser has notice that the trust deed still encumbers the property. And in Baldwin v.
Burton, the Utah Supreme Court held that a purchaser is "required to make inquiry if
his findings would prompt further investigation." 80
Here, Farias had notice of all of the Property's recorded documents. The Property's
title shows that the Phalens took a trust deed — the Phalen Trust Deed — on the property
they sold to the Boecks. The title also shows, through omission, that the Phalen Trust
Deed was never reconveyed. Accordingly, this missing reconveyance notified Farias
that a problem with the Phalen Trust Deed may exist; that notice required Farias to in-

78
79
80

Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-1-2(1) (2010).
Utah Code Ann. § 57-l-33.1(l)(a) (2010).
Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188,1201 n. 46 (Utah 1993) (citing Diversified Equities, Inc.
v. American Savings & Loan Ass'n, 739 P.2d 1133,1137 n. 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)).
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quire about the Vendor Trust Deed and whether it has been satisfied, extinguished, or if
it still encumbers the Property.
But Farias never made a proper inquiry into the Property's title because he relied on
common law.
3. Farias cannot use one common law doctrine (Extinguishment by Foreclosure) to
determine it is a bona fide purchaser while ignoring another common law doctrine (Vendor Purchase Money Mortgage) which proves it is not.
As established above: The Phalen Trust Deed is recorded on title; the FFFC Trust Deed
is recorded on title; FFFCs foreclosure is recorded on title. The Third Party Mortgage's
reconveyance is recorded on title; The Phalen Trust Deed has no reconveyance because it is
nonexistent.
This is the complete notice that Farias had by examining recorded documents.
Yet the trial court then concluded — wrongly — that the Third Party's foreclosure extinguished the Phalen Trust Deed. It used common law to reach this conclusion.
But this conclusion is the trial court's logical paradox. The trial court used common
law — extinguishment by foreclosure — to establish that Farias had no notice that the
Phalen Trust Deed still existed. Yet another common law doctrine —the purchase money mortgage doctrine — holds that the Phalen Trust Deed encumbered the Property.
And the purchase money mortgage doctrine always supersedes the extinguishment by
foreclosure doctrine because, necessarily, the mortgage precedes the foreclosure.
The trial court cannot pick and choose which common law it relies on to establish
notice. And in establishing notice, it cannot elevate one doctrine over the other.
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B. As a matter of law and evidenced by Farias's exhibits, FFFC knew the Phalens
were financing some of the sale of the Property.
Farias stated in its memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment, "there is
no evidence that [FFFC] knew that the Phalens were providing seller financing/' 81 Yet
the exhibits he provides prove otherwise.
In First Nat'l Bank v. Foote, the Utah Supreme Court held "the knowledge of [an]
agent concerning the business which he is transacting for his principal is to be imputed
to his principal/ 782 In Macris v. Sculptured Software, Inc., it stated that a principal is imputed with "[a]n agent's knowledge of matters within the scope of his or her authority
[because] it is presumed that such knowledge will be disclosed to the principal/' 83 And
in Latses v. Nick Floor, Inc., it held this rule is broad and encompasses "all notice or
knowledge relating to the subject-matter of the agency which the agent acquires or obtains while acting as such agent and within the scope of his authority." 84
In this case, both the Phalens and First Franklin shared an agent, US Title. US Title
acted as the trustee for both the Phalens' and First Franklin's trust deeds. As Farias noted, the Phalens and First Franklin consummated this transaction with Boecks at the US
Title Office.85 The First Franklin Trust Deed lists "US TITLE" as its trustee; the Phalens'
note does too. 86 Accordingly, both First Franklin and the Phalens knew of each other as
a matter law.

81

R. 000337.
First Natl Bank v. Foote, 42 P. 205, 207 (Utah 1895).
83
Macris v. Sculptured Software, Inc., 2001 UT 43,121, 24 P.3d 984.
84
Latses v. Nick Floor, Inc., 99 Utah 214, 222,104 P.2d 619, 623 (1940)
85
R. 000320 at ^ 10.
86
Id. at Exhibit I, f (D), and Exhibit B, p. 1, respectively.
82
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*

If Farias relied on common law at all to supplement his understanding of recorded documents — which he freely admits he did —then he must rely on common law in its entirety, including the purchase money mortgage doctrine. If he relied solely on recorded
documents, he should have noticed the absence of the Phalen Trust Deed reconveyance.
Farias cannot claim notice ignorance because one common law doctrine is more axiomatic than another. Moreover, Farias7 agent, Equity Title Insurance Agency, conducted
the title search in this case. Equity Title is aware of the vendor purchase money mortgage lien priority doctrine because in both 2001 and 2005, it published articles instructing its closing agents on the priority of vendor trust deeds and subordination
agreements. 87 Farias had record notice that the Vendor Trust Deed encumbered the
property. Farias is not a bona fide purchaser.
This is reversible error.

CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, Insight asks the Court to vacate the trial court's decision, reverse and remand for findings that Insight is entitled to judgment on its in rem foreclosure because
Farias is not a bona fide purchaser and the vendor purchase money mortgage doctrine
prioritizes the Phalen Trust Deed such that it still encumbers the property. Moreover,
Insight is entitled to its attorney fees on appeal under the terms of the Phalen Trust
Deed and Note. 88

87
88

R. 000462 at Exhibit D & E.
R. 000001 at Exhibit B & C.
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RULES
U T A H RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56

(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or crossclaim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20
days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary
judgment by the adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part
thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim
is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary
judgment as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be
in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although
there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is
not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary,
the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence
before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material
facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and
in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that
appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of
damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings
in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would
be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts
thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The
court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers
to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is
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made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a
party failing to file such a response.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party
opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit
facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application
for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this
rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of
the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of
contempt.
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STATUTES
TITLE 38 PROPERTY- REAL AND PERSONAL
CHAPTER 35 CONVEYANCING A N D RECORDING
SECTION 109 INSTRUMENT MAY BE RECORDED- VALIDITY OF UNRECORDED
INSTRUMENTS- LIABILITY FOR FRAUDULENT DOCUMENTS.

C O L O R A D O REVISED STATUTES

§ 38-35-109(1)

(1) All deeds, powers of attorney, agreements, or other instruments in writing
conveying, encumbering, or affecting the title to real property, certificates, and
certified copies of orders, judgments, and decrees of courts of record may be recorded in the office of the county clerk and recorder of the county where such real
property is situated; except that all instruments conveying the title of real property to the state or a political subdivision shall be recorded pursuant to section 3835-109.5. No such unrecorded instrument or document shall be valid against any
person with any kind of rights in or to such real property who first records and
those holding rights under such person, except between the parties thereto and
against those having notice thereof prior to acquisition of such rights. This is a
race-notice recording statute. In all cases where by law an instrument may be
filed in the office of a county clerk and recorder, the filing thereof in such office
shall be equivalent to the recording thereof, and the recording thereof in the office of such county clerk and recorder shall be equivalent to the filing thereof.
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TITLE 57 PROPERTY- REAL ESTATE
CHAPTER 1 CONVEYANCES
SECTION 33.1 RECONVEYANCE OF A TRUST DEED -ERRONEOUS RECONVEYANCE

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-33.1(1)(a)
(1) (a) When an obligation secured by a trust deed has been satisfied, the trustee
shall, upon written request by the beneficiary, reconvey the trust property.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TITLE 57 PROPERTY- REAL ESTATE
CHAPTER 3 RECORDING OF DOCUMENTS
SECTION 103 EFFECT OF FAILURE TO RECORD

Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-103.
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if:
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and for a
valuable consideration; and
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded.
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TITLE 57 PROPERTY- REAL ESTATE
CHAPTER 3 RECORDING OF DOCUMENTS
SECTION 102 RECORD IMPARTS NOTICE- CHANGE IN INTEREST RATE- NOTICE OF
UNNAMED INTERESTS- CONVEYANCE BY GRANTEE

Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-102(1).
(1) Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, in the manner prescribed by this title, each original document or certified copy of a document
complying with Section 57-4a-3, whether or not acknowledged, each copy of a
notice of location complying with Section 40-1-4, and each financing statement
complying with Section 70A-9a-502, whether or not acknowledged shall, from
the time of recording with the appropriate county recorder, impart notice to all
persons of their contents.
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TITLE 70 A U N I F O R M COMMERCIAL C O D E
CHAPTER 9 A U N I F O R M COMMERCIAL C O D E - SECURED TRANSACTIONS
SECTION 103 PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY INTEREST- APPLICATION OF PAYMENTSBURDEN

OF ESTABLISHING

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-103.
(1) In this section:
(a) "purchase-money collateral" means goods or software that secures a purchasemoney obligation incurred with respect to that collateral; and
(b) "purchase-money obligation" means an obligation of an obligor incurred as all or
part of the price of the collateral or for value given to enable the debtor to acquire rights
in or the use of the collateral if the value is in fact so used.
(2) A security interest in goods is a purchase-money security interest:
(a) to the extent that the goods are purchase-money collateral with respect to that security interest;
(b) if the security interest is in inventory that is or was purchase-money collateral, also to the extent that the security interest secures a purchase-money obligation incurred
with respect to other inventory in which the secured party holds or held a purchasemoney security interest; and
(c) also to the extent that the security interest secures a purchase-money obligation
incurred with respect to software in which the secured party holds or held a purchasemoney security interest.
(3) A security interest in software is a purchase-money security interest to the extent
that the security interest also secures a purchase-money obligation incurred with respect to goods in which the secured party holds or held a purchase-money security interest if:
(a) the debtor acquired its interest in the software in an integrated transaction in
which it acquired an interest in the goods; and
(b) the debtor acquired its interest in the software for the principal purpose of using
the software in the goods.
(4) The security interest of a consignor in goods that are the subject of a consignment
is a purchase-money security interest in inventory.
(5) In a transaction other than a consumer-goods transaction, if the extent to which a
security interest is a purchase-money security interest depends on the application of a
payment to a particular obligation, the payment must be applied:
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(a) in accordance with any reasonable method of application to which the parties
agree;
(b) in the absence of the parties' agreement to a reasonable method, in accordance
with any intention of the obligor manifested at or before the time of payment; or
(c) in the absence of an agreement to a reasonable method and a timely manifestation
of the obligor's intention, in the following order:
(i) to obligations that are not secured; and
(ii) if more than one obligation is secured, to obligations secured by purchase-money
security interests in the order in which those obligations were incurred.
(6) In a transaction other than a consumer-goods transaction, a purchase-money security interest does not lose its status as such, even if:
(a) the purchase-money collateral also secures an obligation that is not a purchasemoney obligation;
(b) collateral that is not purchase-money collateral also secures the purchase-money
obligation; or
(c) the purchase-money obligation has been renewed, refinanced, consolidated, or restructured.
(7) In a transaction other than a consumer-goods transaction, a secured party claiming a purchase-money security interest has the burden of establishing the extent to
which the security interest is a purchase-money security interest.
(8) The limitation of the rules in Subsections (5), (6), and (7) to transactions other than
consumer-goods transactions is intended to leave to the court the determination of the
proper rules in consumer-goods transactions. The court may not infer from that limitation the nature of the proper rule in consumer-goods transactions and may continue to
apply established approaches.
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ADDENDUM B
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